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TITLE VII: ARE EXCEPTIONS
SWALLOWING THE RULE?
INTRODUCTION
Title VII, 1 heralded as the key to guaranteeing long-awaited
sexual equality in employment practices, is failing in that promise.
Many of the same stereotypical notions regarding a "woman's place,"
which Title VII was designed to overcome, are rearing their heads in
judicial determinations of actual Title VII challenges.
This article will examine the approach of the United States
Supreme Court to pregnancy exclusion and bona fide occupational
qualification 2 as exceptions to compliance with Title VII. Because of
the Court's seeming inconsistencies of analysis, treatment of lower
court fact finding, and apparent disregard of Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission guidelines, the express goals of Title VII are
being thwarted. Because sex stereotypes are so deeply ingrained, sex
discrimination is not being addressed by the Court as forthrightly under
Title VII as is race discrimination. The unfortunate result is the under-
mining of women's attempts to achieve the law's guarantee of equality
of treatment in employment.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Acts was intended to eradicate
all forms of discriminatory employment practices based upon race, re-
ligion, national origin, or sex.4 Although the sex discrimination clause
may have been a congressional "afterthought," introduced by southern
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 253 (current
version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) addresses the exception of the bona fide occupational
qualification: "(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his . . . sex . . . in those certain
instances where. . . sex. . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . ... "
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-708, 78 Stat. 253 (current
version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), provides in part:
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(I) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimin-
ate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin ....
1
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19771 TITLE VII
opponents of the Act in an effort to sabotage it,5 Congress nevertheless
enacted the bill, including the ban on sex discrimination. Whatever
may have been the real congressional intent, the promise of Title Vfl
was to prohibit the inequalities of employment opportunity burdening
women in the work force.
Equal protection under section one of the fourteenth amendment6
served as a basis for attacks on sex-based discrimination before the en-
actment of Title VII. 7 Because equal protection analysis does not
accord sex-based classifications the same strict scrutiny as those based
on race, 8 sex discrimination has been allowed to flourish in situations
where race discrimination would not.9 Title VII, however, purported
to put race and sex on an equal footing 0 with regard to prohibitions
against discrimination. Protection against sex discrimination, so elusive
and illusory under the Constitution, was to be granted by statute. Also,
because Title VII- applied to private employers, litigants would no
longer be required to show state action in acts of discrimination.'1 The
great hope of Title VII was that it would eradicate all forms of sex dis-
crimination in employment: 12
5. See 110 CoNG. REC. 2489 (1964) (remarks of Representative Green). Binder,
Pregnancy, Maternity Leave and Title VII, 1 Omo N. L. REv. 31 (1973). See
generally Note, Classification of the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50
IOWA L. REv. 778, 791 (1965); Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 VAND. L. REv. 484, 491 (1968); Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Comment, Civil Rights: Private Employer's Denial of Disability Benefits for
Pregnancy Leave Survives a Title VII Challenge, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 745, 746 (1977).
8. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HA v. L. REv. 1, 8-48 (1972).
9. Compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Vorcheimer
v. School District of Philadelphia, 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977) (segregation in education);
Compare American Communications Ass'n v. NLRB, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) with
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (employment); Compare Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 463 (1947) with Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (jury service).
10. The text of the Act itself applies the same prohibitions against sex discrimina-
tion as it does against race discrimination. See note 4 supra. Although the bfoq (bona
fide occupational qualification) exception applies only to sex classification and not to
race, it is to be applied narrowly (see notes 122-31 infra and accompanying text), and
it is the only feature which differentiates sex from race in Title VII protection.
11. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is applicable only to
state action, and a nexus with state action has been required to show unconstitutional
discrimination. State action may range from obvious legislative denial of equal protec-
tion to misuse of power under color of state law. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: What Has Title VII Accom.
plished for the Female?, 9 U. RiCm. L. Rnv. 149, 157 (1974).
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If Title VII continues to succeed, it may conceivably
surpass the results envisioned by the supporters of the pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment. This is because the ERA,
while seemingly broad, fails to proscribe sex discrimination
where it most frequently occurs, in the private sector. Title
VII should, therefore, remain the single most effective means
to attack sex discrimination in employment, regardless of
ratification of the ERA.'
Title VII was believed to mark the ascendance of the philosophy
stressing equality of the sexes, a creed which rejects the necessity for
nineteenth century "protective legislation."' 4  It was reasonable there-
fore, to assume that women at last could escape the stigma of limiting
stereotypes and be regarded as individuals by employers evaluating their
qualifications and capabilities for employment. No longer would
women be denied equal treatment by their employers because of
notions of a "woman's place," that is, primarily as a wife and mother
rather than as an important member of the working force.
Such visions have been shattered, however, as the United States
Supreme Court has succumbed to the very stereotypes which Title VII
sought to overcome. In its treatment of pregnancy classification' and
bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) exceptions to proscriptions
against discriminatory sex practices,' 6 the Court has resorted to reliance
on sex-role stereotypes of women as weak and vulnerable because of
their reproductive functions and sexuality.' 7
In addition, the concept of "sex-plus""' classification, believed to
13. Id. at 158 (footnotes omitted). The proposed twenty-seventh amendment
(Equal Rights Amendment) reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
14. Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DumE LJ. 671, at 671-73.
15. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
16. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977). See notes 69, 101-11 infra and
accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, id., and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976). For further discussion of this proposition, see Erickson, Women and
the Supreme Court: Anatomy is Destiny, 41 BROOK.YN L. Rav. 209 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Erickson].
18. Chief Judge Brown coined this phrase in his dissent from the Fifth Circuit's
denial of a rehearing in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (1969).
This was the only Title VII case concerning sex discrimination to reach the Supreme
Court prior to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
[Vol. 13:102
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have been laid to rest by the Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.,19 is alive and well in the double standards allowed to survive
Title VII challenges in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert20 and Dothard
v. Rawlinson.21 Plaintiff in Phillips challenged, under Title VII, the
practice of an employer who, while routinely hiring men with preschool
age children, refused to hire similarly situated women. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the district court's granting
of summary judgment for the defendant corporation, 22 stated:
A per se violation of the Act can only be discrimination based
solely on one of the categories, i.e., in the case of sex; women
vis-a-vis men. When another criterion of employment is
added to one of the classifications listed in the Act, there is
no longer apparent discrimination based solely on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin ...
The discrimination [in the case at bar] was based on
a two-pronged qualification, i.e., a woman with pre-school age
children. Ida Phillips was not refused employment because
she was a woman nor because she had pre-school children.
It is the coalescence of these two elements that denied her
the position she desired.23
Dissenting from the Fifth Circuit's denial of a rehearing,24 Chief Judge
Brown labeled the majority's "coalescence" theory as "sex-plus" and
predicted that, if it were upheld, Title VII would be dead.2"
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Phillips was
vacated and remanded in a per curiam opinion.26  Although the em-
ployer's policy did not indicate a bias against women as such, the Court
held that Title VII did not permit one hiring policy for women and
another for men. Men and women cannot be judged by different stan-
dards for job-related purposes. The "sex-plus" theory, used by the
Fifth Circuit to justify disparate treatment of women was, in effect,
struck down.
In Gilbert,23 however, the Court was dealing with a pregnancy
19. 400 U.s. 542 (1971).
20. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
21. 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
22. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 58 Lab. Cas. 9152 (M.D. Fla. .1968).
23. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 3-4 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1258 (5th Cir. 1969).
25. Id. at 1260.
26. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
27. For a more detailed examination of "sex-plus", see generally Bartlett, Pregnancy
and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1532 (1974); Note, Title
VII, Pregnancy and Disability Payments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEO. WASH.
L. Rv. 381 (1976); Erickson, supra note 17, at 281-82.
28. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
1977]
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classification, and the double standard survived a Title VII challenge.
Plaintiffs29 charged that General Electric's exclusion of benefits for
pregnancy-related disabilities constituted unlawful sex discrimination.
In allowing the exclusion to stand, the majority pointed out that the
General Electric Plan 0 covers exactly the same categories of risk, and
is facially non-discriminatory in the sense that "'t]here is no risk from
which men are protected and women are not. Likewise there is no
risk from which women are protected and men are not."' 3  However,
the fact that only pregnancy is excluded from coverage under the plan,
and that only women are affected by that exclusion, indicates that one
standard of disability is being applied to men and another to women.
The economic hardship imposed by pregnancy may be no less than
that resulting from illness or injury. 2 Although protection against such
hardship is the goal of the Plan, denial of pregnancy coverage imposes a
burden on women which is not imposed on disabled males. Disquali-
fication of pregnancy coverage on the basis of its "voluntariness" is in-
consistent with inclusion of coverage of such "voluntary" male surgery
as vasectomy. To allow coverage under the Plan for virtually all disa-
29. The suit was brought as a class action. In addition to Martha Gilbert, there
were six other original named plaintiffs, all of whom were in the employ of General
Electric, who became pregnant during 1971 and were denied disability benefits under
General Electric's insurance plan. They were joined by the International Union of
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, and that union's local affiliate. 429 U.S. at
129 n.4.
30. The Court characterized the coverage as follows:
As part of its total compensation package, General Electric provides non-
occupational sickness and accident benefits to all employees under its Weekly
Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan (the Plan) in an amount equal to 60%
of an employee's normal straight-time weekly earnings. These payments are
paid to employees who become totally disabled as a result of a nonoccupational
sickness or accident. Benefit payments normally start with the eighth day of
an employee's total disability (although if an employee is earlier confined to
a hospital as a bed patient, benefit payments will start immediately), and con-
tinue up to a maximum of 26 weeks for any one continuous period of disability
or successive periods of disability due to the same or related causes.
429 U.S. at 128 (footnote omitted).
The Court then further described the plan in a footnote:
Additionally, benefit payment coverage under the Plan for all disabilities,
whether or not related to pregnancy, terminates "on the date you cease active
work because of total disability or pregnancy, except that if you are entitled
to Weekly Benefits for a disability existing on such date of cessation" benefit
payments will be continued in accordance with the provisions of the Plan. In
cases of personal leave, layoff, or strike, however, the coverage for future non-
occupational sickness or accident disability is continued for 31 days.
Id. at 129 n.4.
31. 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting from Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97, de-
cided under the fourteenth amendment) (citation omitted).
32. See Note, Title VII, Pregnancy and Disability Payments: Women and Children
Last, 44 Gno. WAsH. L. REv. 381, 393-94 n.24.
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bilities men may encounter while excluding only that "disability" exclu-
sively affecting women is to apply separate standards of disability to
men and women. According to Phillips, such a double standard
violates Title V11 .88
In Dothard v. Rawlinson84 the Court's acceptance of the presum-
ably prohibited double standard of "sex-plus" was manifested by its
agreement with the defendant state's characterization of a facially dis-
criminatory regulation as a bona fide occupational qualification.85
Plaintiff Rawlinson36 was refused employment as a correctional coun-
selor trainee in the Alabama state penitentiary system because she
failed to meet the minimum 120-pound weight requirement established
by an Alabama statute.yr In challenging the state's height and weight
requirements, she also challenged Administration Regulation 204,38
33. 400 U.S. at 544; see also note 32 supra, at 394.
34. 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970 & Supp. II 1972). The bfoq applies if an em-
ployer is able to demonstrate that the position in question requires a particular sex for
its successful performance. If the bfoq exception is deemed applicable, the employer
will not have violated Title VII, even though he hires male employees exclusively. See
notes 123-31 infra and accompanying text.
36. A second plaintiff named in the case was Brenda Mieth, who, on behalf of her-
self and others similarly situated, challenged the height and weight requirements for the
position of Alabama state trooper. 97 S. Ct. at 2724 n.4.
37. ALA. CoDE tit. 55, § 373(109) (Supp. 1973). See 97 S. Ct. at 2724.
38. Adopted by the Alabama Board of Corrections while the suit was pending, Ad-
ministrative Regulation 204 provides in pertinent part:
I. GENERAL
1. The purpose of this regulation is to establish policy and procedure for
identifying and designating institutional Correctional Counselor I positions
which require selective certification for appointment of either male or female
employees from State Personnel Department registers.
II. POLICY
4. All Correctional Counselor I positions will be evaluated to identify
and designate those which require selective certification for appointment of
either male or female employee. Such positions must fall within a bona fide
occupational qualification stated in Title 45-2000c of the United States Code.
5. Selective certification from the Correctional Counselor Trainee reg-
ister will be requested of the State Personnel Department whenever a position
is being filled which has been designated for either a male or female employee
only.
m. PROCEDURE
8. Institutional Wardens and Directors will identify each institutional
Correctional Counselor I position which they feel requires selective certifica-
tion....
9. The request will contain the exact duties and responsibilities of the
position and will utilize and identify the following criteria to establish that sel-
ective certification is necessary;
A. That the presence of the opposite sex would cause disruption of the
orderly running and security of the institution.
B. That the position would require contact with the inmates of the op-
6
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which had the effect of preventing women from being considered for
approximately 75% of the correctional counselor positions available in
the Alabama prison system. 9 A three-judge federal district court
decided in her favor on both issues. 40  On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed regarding the height and
weight requirements and reversed regarding Regulation 204.41 The
restriction against women serving as correctional counselors in "contact
positions" was upheld as a bfoq because "[a] woman's relative ability
to maintain order in a male, maximimum security, unclassified peniten-
tiary of the type Alabama now runs could be directly reduced by her
womanhood."42 In other words, male applicants for correctional coun-
selors are to be evaluated according to their capabilities, and females
may be judged in terms of their sexuality. As Justice Marshall pointed
out in a forceful dissent, "[ilt appears that the real disqualifying factor
in the Court's view is '[t]he employee's very womanhood.' 43 The
Court failed to discuss the generally high incidence of homosexuality
prevalent in the Alabama prisons44 or to speculate on the relative vul-
nerability of male guards to homosexual attack by prisoners. Though
the Court noted that the inmates are "deprived of a normal hetero-
sexual envoronment, ' '45 it is speculated that they "would assault women
guards because they were women. '46 In the eyes of the Court, women
guards are viewed primarily in terms of their sexuality rather than as
posite sex without the presence of others.
C. That the position would require patrolling dormitories, restrooms, or
showers while in use, frequently, during the day or night.
D. That the position would require search of inmates of the opposite sex
on a regular basis.
E. That the position would require that the Correctional Counselor
Trainee not be armed with a firearm.
10. All institutional Correctional Counselor I positions which are not ap-
proved for selective certification will be filled from Correctional Counselor
Trainee registers without regard to sex.
ArA. ADMAN. REG. No. 204 (1975). The Court noted:
Although Regulation 204 is not limited on its face to contact positions in
maximum security institutions, the District Court found that it did not "pre-
clud[e women] from serving in contact positions in the all-male institutions
other than the penitentiaries. 418 F. Supp. at 1176. Petitioners similarly de-
fended the regulation as applying only to maximum security facilities.
97 S. Ct. at 2724-25 n.6.
39. 97 S. Ct. at 2728 n.16.
40. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
41. 97 S. Ct. at 2730.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2734 (quoting from the majority opinion, 97 S. Ct. at 2730).
44. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
45. 97 S. Ct. at 2730 (emphasis added).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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the trained, disciplined professionals their male counterparts are per-
ceived to be. It would appear that the "sex-plus" double standard has
prevailed again to undermine the promise of Title VII.
I. TITLE VII ANALYSIS: ABANDONED IN Gilbert AND Dothard
The model for Title VII analysis, as developed by the United
States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 47 and Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody4" (both race discrimination challenges) involves
basically a three-step approach. First, facially neutral standards shown
to have a discriminatory effect may establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. This triggers the second step in which the burden is
shifted to the employer to show that the requirement has a "manifest ' '49
relation to the employment. If the employer proves the challenged re-
quirements are job related, step three allows the plaintiff to show that
other, less discriminatory selection devices would "serve the employer's
legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'"
Such analysis, unfortunately, was not applied to the Title VII challenge
in Gilbert. Instead the Court short-circuited its analysis to the usual
equal protection model, via a definitional substitution, which allowed
the same result to be reached as in Geduldig v. Aiello. 1
In Aiello, female employees brought a constitutional challenge to
California's state administered disability insurance fund.52 The fund
did not compensate women who became continuously disabled as a re-
sult of normal pregnancy.53 By characterizing the case as involving a
social welfare program," rather than the fundamental right of procrea-
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
48. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
49. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
50. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting from Mc-
Donnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
51. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
52. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1-4751 (West 1972).
53. The program excluded "any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection
with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days
thereafter." Id., § 2626 (1972). Prior to Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974),
a California state court had limited the pregnancy exclusion to normal pregnancies.
Rentzer v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 336 (1973). The California legislature then amended § 2626 accordingly to
limit the exclusion. 417 U.S. at 490 & nn.14 & 15.
54. The standard of review in the equal protection model varies according to the
nature of the classification and the group or rights affected. See note 55 infra. A
classification drawn along economic or social policy lines satisfies the equal protection
requirement when the state advances a merely rational basis for the classification. See,
e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 502 (1934).
1977]
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tion, 5 the Court was able to find a rational basis for the pregnancy
exclusion and thus uphold it. In determining that the statute did not
discriminate on the basis of sex, the Court utilized insurance terminol-
ogy which reinforced its characterization of the program as mere
economic and social welfare legislation: "There is no evidence in the
record that the selection of the risks insured by the program worked
to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the ag-
gregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the
program.
56
The Court reserved for a footnote its attempt to explain how a
pregnancy classification is not necessarily sex-based:
The California insurance program does not exclude any-
one from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely re-
moves one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of
compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women
can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classifica-
tion like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero,
supra. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics. 7
In considering the relevance of the Aiello footnote to Gilbert's
Title VII challenge, Judge Russell, writing for the majority of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreted it as being applicable to
an equal protection challenge, but not to Title VIH analysis. Although
the California insurance fund in Aiello withstood the equal protection
challenge because the classification was "rationally supportable"58 and
did not amount to "invidious discrimination," 59 those were not the
55. A challenged regulation which classifies on the basis of inherently suspect cri-
teria, such as race, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), or which
involves an alleged infringement of a fundamental right, such as procreation, see, e.g.,
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), is given strict scrutiny,
and the state must show that a compelling interest is served by the classification if the
statute is to survive a constitutional challenge. Generally, great deference is given to
legislation under the "rational basis" test, in keeping with the general presumption of
constitutionality of state statutes, while almost nothing can survive "strict scrutiny."
Compare Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) with Kramer v. Union Free School
District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
56. 417 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. n.20. (References are to Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). Justice Brennan's dissent claimed these cases
should control because the classification was based on gender, to which a stricter stand-
ard of scrutiny-though not the strict scrutiny afforded "suspect classifications"--is ap-
plied. 417 U.S. at 504-05.
58. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (1975). See also Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1975).
59. 519 F.2d at 669.
[Vol. 13:102
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issues at hand in Gilbert. The issue was "'one of statutory interpreta-
tion rather than one of constitutional analysis.' ,60
The Court in Washington v. Davis61 had noted the different
standards to be applied to constitutional and Title VII analysis,62 yet
in Gilbert, the Court determined that equal protection concepts of dis-
crimination were a "useful starting place" for defining the term "dis-
crimination," which "Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined
*.., The additional finding that the California disability plan in
Aiello was "strikingly similar"64 to the plan provided by General Electric,
made Aiello "quite relevant in determining whether or not the preg-
nancy exclusion did discriminate on the basis of sex." 65
Because the Aiello concepts prevailed, the Court found no dis-
crimination to trigger the further stages of Title VII analysis. Unlike
conventional Title VI recognition of a discriminatory pattern, which
places the burden of proof on the employer to justify his classification,
Gilbert defined the pregnancy classification as not being discriminatory
to begin with, and thus precluded consideration of whether it was a job-
related necessity and, then, whether less discriminatory devices existed.66
Justice Stevens' dissent contended the issue was simply one of stat-
utory construction and maintained that the constitutional holding in
Aiello did not control. Citing Washington v. Davis,6" he observed that
the plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie constitutional violation
is "significantly heavier than the burden of proving a prima facie viola-
60. Id. at 667.
61. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
62. In Washington v. Davis, id., the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia for erroneously applying Title VII standards to a due pro-
cess discrimination claim. Id. at 238. See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
90 H v. L. Rv. 1, 120-21 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L RaV. 540 (1977).
63. 429 U.S. at 133.
64. Actually, General Electric's Plan was more restrictive than California's because
it excluded coverage of all pregnancy-related disabilities, whereas California's excluded
only disabilities resulting from normal pregnancy (see note 42 supra). As Brennan, J.
noted in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert:
The experience of one of the class plaintiffs is instructive of the reach of
the pregnancy exclusion. On April 5, 1972, she took a pregnancy leave, de-
livering a stillborn baby some 9 days later. Upon her return home, she suf-
fered a blood clot in the lung, a condition unrelated to her pregnancy, and was
rehospitalized. The company declined her claim for disability payments on the
ground that pregnancy severed her eligibility under the plan. . . .Had she
been separated from work for any other reason-for example, during a work
stoppage-the plan would have fully covered the embolism.
Id. at 151-52 n.4, (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 133.
66. See notes 62-65 supra, 67-71 infra and accompanying text.
67. 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
1977] TITLE VII
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tion of a statutory prohibition against discrimination." ' 8  Applying
conventional Title VII analysis, he concluded the statute plainly re-
quired affirmation of the Fourth Circuit's judgment.
The Court in Dothard purported to apply the three-step Title VII
analysis, and actually did so regarding the facially neutral height and
weight requirements. However, in considering the state's justification
for the blanket exclusion of women from "contact" positions in the
prisons as a bfoq,69 the Court failed to implement step three-the
search for a less discriminatory selection device.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart described the three-step
process for Title VII analysis and proceeded to apply that process to
the fact situation. Because the height and weight requirements ex-
cluded 41.3% of the female population while excluding less than
one percent of the male population, the Court agreed that the plaintiffs
had established a prima facie case of discrimination. 70 As the state
had produced no evidence correlating these requirements with the
requisite amount of strength thought essential to job performance, they
had failed to justify the standards as bona fide job requirements. Even
if the state had shown strength to be a bona fide job-related quality,
a less discriminatory test which measured strength directly would have
served their purpose.
Without discussing, for the present, the merits of the Court's
reasoning in accepting Regulation 204 "within the narrow ambit of the
bfoq exception, '71 it is significant that the majority did not complete
the analysis and consider the availability of less discriminatory devices.
As Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, the successful experi-
ences of the states of California and Washington in allowing women
to serve as guards in maximum security institutions, "confirm that ab-
solute disqualification of women is not, in the words of Title VII,
'reasonably necessary to the normal operation' of a maximum security
prison." 72  The Court's acceptance of the "barbaric and inhumane"
conditions in Alabama prisons73 as justification for otherwise unlawful
discrimination against women "sounds distressingly like saying two
68. 429 U.S. at 160 (footnote omitted).
69. See note 2 supra.
70. 97 S. Ct. at 2727.
71. Id. at 2729. For an analysis of the Court's reasoning on the point, see notes
91-107 infra and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 2733.
73. See James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329-31 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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wrongs make a right.7 4 Justice Marshall emphasized that the uncon-
stitutional conditions ordered corrected in James v. Wallace75 cannot
be accepted as "normal operation" contemplated by the statute:76
A prison system operating in blatant violation of the Eighth
Amendment is an exception that should be remedied with
all possible speed, as Judge Johnson's comprehensive order
in James v. Wallace . . . is designed to do. In the mean-
time, the existence of such violations should not be legitima-
tized by calling them "normal." Nor should the Court accept
them as justifying conduct that would otherwise violate a stat-
ute intended to remedy age-old discrimination. 77
An extension of the Court's analysis to the third step in Title VII
analysis (consideration of the less discriminatory alternative of altering
the prison system to conform to constitutional standards) would have
had the effect either of disallowing the bfoq exception entirely or of
limiting its application to a time period consistent with that allotted
for compliance with constitutional requirements. As the decision
stands, however, females may be excluded from 75% of correction
positions indefinitely 78
HT. FINDINGS OF FACT
As noted earlier, the standards of review for Title VII and equal
protection challenges are different.79 Title VII analysis is stricter be-
cause discriminatory purpose need not be proven to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. A disproportionate impact on one class
or a discriminatory pattern is enough to shift the burden to the im-
ployer to justify the classification. 0 Constitutional challenges, how-
ever, require a showing of purposeful discrimination to trigger judicial
scrutiny, although intent may be inferred from a discriminatory pattern. 81
Though the difference between the standards may appear to be more
semantic than substantial, presumably the Court would have greater
flexibility under the constitutional standard. It is, after all, strictly a
matter of judgment whether a pattern of discrimination is significant
74. 97 S. Ct. at 2733.
75. 406 F. Supp. 318 (1976).
76. 97 S. Ct. at 2733.
77. Id.
78. See notes 38 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 58-62, 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
81. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
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enough to imply intent. Furthermore, the mere "inference" of intent
is not necessarily sufficient to show purposeful discrimination.
The district court in Gilbert, employing the Title VII standard
of analysis, refused to consider the issue of intent. Because discrimina-
tory effect alone was enough to violate Title VII, the district court failed
to rule on evidence which could have borne on the issue of purpose:
"Plaintiffs have introduced much evidence in an effort to demonstrate
that G.E.'s past history is dominated by a strain of male chauvinism.
The Court deems that line of inquiry legally irrelevant and makes no
findings with respect to this contention.""2  The court of appeals also
saw the issue as one of effect rather than of motive: "It is of no
moment that an employer may not have deliberately intended sex-
related discrimination; the statute looks to 'consequences,' not in-
tent"88
The Supreme Court, however, viewed the effect of G.E.'s plan
in light of Aiello: because a pregnancy exclusion is not sex discrimina-
tion, there has been no discriminatory effect.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear
upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides poten-
tial recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes.8 4
As Justice Brennan noted in his Gilbert dissent, however, Aiello's
"outcome was qualified by the explicit reservation of a case where it
could be demonstrated that a pregnancy-centered differentiation is
used as a 'mere pretext. . . designed to effect an invidious discrimina-
tion against the members of one sex . . . . " Further, the inquiry
into "pretext" in Aiello was conducted with the normal presumption
favoring the constitutionality of legislative action that is not applicable
to the broad social objectives promoted by Title VII. 6  "Moreover,
the Court studiously ignores the undisturbed conclusion of the District
Court that General Electric's 'discriminatory attitude' toward women
82. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 380 (E.D;Va. 19.74).
83. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
84. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20.(1974).
85. 429 U.S. at 149 (quoting Geduldig v. Ailello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974)).
86. 429 U.S. at 149. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415
(1819) for further discussion of "pretext".
(Vol. 13:102
13
Ogg: Title VII: Are Exceptions Swallowing the Rule
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
as a motivating factor in its policy, . . . 'and that the pregnancy exclu-
sion was neutral [neither] on its face' nor 'in its intent.' "8
Some of the evidence referred to by the district court as legally
irrelevant would be relevant indeed in uncovering a possible "pretext."
Justice Brennan summarized such pertinent evidence from the record
in a footnote:
General Electric's disability program was developed in
an earlier era when women openly were presumed to play
only a minor and temporary role in the labor force. As
originally conceived in 1926, General Electric offered no
benefit plan to its female employees because "'women did
not recognize the responsibilities of life, for they probably
were hoping to get married soon and leave the Company.'"
App. 958, excerpted from D. Loth, Swope of G.E.: Story of
Gerald Swope and General Electric in American Business
(1958). It was not until the 1930's and 1940's that the com-
pany made female employees eligible to participate in the
disability program. In common with general business prac-
tice, however, General Electric continued to pursue a policy
of taking pregnancy and other factors into account in order
to scale women's wages at 2/ the level of men's. Id.,
at 1002. More recent company policies reflect common
stereotypes concerning the potentialities of pregnant women,
see e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 644 (1974), and have coupled forced maternity leave
with the nonpayment of disability payments. Thus, the Dis-
trict Court found, "In certain instances it appears that the
pregnant employee was required to take leave of her position
three months prior to birth and not permitted to return until
six weeks after the birth. In other instances the periods
varied. . . . In short, of all the employees it is only preg-
nant women who have been required to cease work regard-
less of their desire and physical ability to work and only they
have been required to remain off their job for an arbitrary
period after the birth of their child." 375 F.Supp. 367, 385.
In February 1973, approximately coinciding with commence-
ment of this suit, the company abandoned its forced-mater-
nity-leave policy by formal directive. 8
Without any reference whatsoever to this evidence, the majority con-
cluded that there was no more showing than in Aiello that exclusion
of pregnancy benefits was a pretext.89
87. 429 U.S. at 149-50 (quoting the district court's opinion, 375 F. Supp. at 382-
83).
88. Id. at 149-50 n.1.
89. Id. at 136.
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Whether such evidence was sufficient to show purposeful dis-
crimination should have been a question of fact to be determined by the
district court on remand. If such evidence is simply ignored, it is
difficult to predict what sort of evidence the Court would find persua-
sive or indeed what standard of proof will be required to find the
elusive "pretext."
The Court also failed to take certain evidence into account in con-
sidering the "effect" of G.E.'s pregnancy exclusion. As Justice Brennan
noted in his dissent:
General Electric's disability program has three divisible
sets of effects. First, the plan covers all disabilities that mu-
tually inflict both sexes . . . . Second, the plan insures
against all disabilities that are male-specific or have a pre-
dominant impact on males. Finally, all female-specific and
female-impacted disabilities are covered, except for the most
prevalent, pregnancy. The Court focuses on the first factor
-the equal inclusion of mutual risks-and therefore under-
standably can identify no discriminatory effect arising from
the plan. 0
Such selective consideration of one innocuous effect, while ignoring the
adverse impact on women of effects two and three, allowed the Court
to accept a discriminatory pattern forbidden by Title VII.
Objectivity fared little better in the Court's consideration of the
factual pattern in Dothard. Although the Court upheld the admissibil-
ity of the plaintiff's statistics regarding the effect of height and weight
requirements, Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion provided a blue-
print for future defendants to use in justifying similar discriminatory
impact. Furthermore, the evidence which persuaded the three judge
panel below to find Regulation 204 unlawful was disregarded alto-
gether, in favor of that introduced by the defendant state.Y1
Appellant corrections officials challenged the use of statistics
drawn from a nationwide data base to show the disproportionate impact
of height and weight requirements on women. They pointed out plain-
tiff Rawlinson's "failure to adduce comparative statistics concerning
actual applicants for correctional counselor positions in Alabama. ' 112
Noting the deterrent effect such minimum physical requirements could
have had on potential applicants, the majority concluded that "reliance
90. Id. at 155.
91. 97 S. Ct. at 2730, 2734-35,
92. Id. at 2727,
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on general population demographic data was not misplaced where there
was no reason to suppose that physical height and weight characteristics
of Alabama men and women differ markedly from those of the national
population." 93 Because the employer had failed to discredit the state's
evidence or to present countervailing evidence of his own, the district
court's finding of discriminatory impact was allowed to stand. 94
It is instructive, however, to examine Justice Rehnquist's concur-
ring opinion in which he described (perhaps for the benefit of future
defendant employers) the tactics with which to rebut similar charges.
In this transparent effort to limit the Court's holding to the narrow facts
of the case at bar, Justice Rehnquist grudgingly conceded the defense
here had not been adequate, but then proceeded to outline the circum-
stances under which height and weight restrictions could withstand a
Title VII challenge:
Appellants, in order to rebut the prima facie case under
the statute, had the burden placed on them to advance job-
related reasons for the qualification. McDonnel Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, at 802... (1973). This bur-
den could be shouldered by offering evidence or by making
legal arguments not dependent on any new evidence. The
District Court was confronted, however, with only one sug-
gested job-related reason for the qualification-that of
strength. Appellants argued only the job-relatedness of
actual physical strength; they did not urge that an equally
job-related qualification for prison guards is the appearance
of strength. As the Court notes, the primary job of correc-
tional counselor in Alabama prisons "is to maintain security
and control of the inmates . . ," ante, at 2725, a function
that I at least would imagine is aided by the psychological
impact on prisoners of the presence of tall and heavy guards.
If the appearance of strength had been urged upon the Dis-
trict Court here as a reason for the height and weight
minima, I think that the District Court would surely have
been entitled to reach a different result than it did. For,
even if not perfectly correlated, I would think that Title VII
would not preclude a State from saying that anyone under
5'2" or 120 pounds, no matter how strong in fact, does not




94. Id. at 2727-30.
95. Id. at 2732 (emphasis in original) (joining in the opinion were Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun).
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In overturning the district court, which had rejected the state's con-
tention that Regulation 204 (excluding women from contact positions
in all-male penitentiaries) fell within the bfoq exception, the majority
took great liberties with the district court's findings of fact.
The majority concluded that there was great danger of assault on
women guards, based on evidence contained in the record of "an
attack on a female clerical worker in an Alabama prison, and of an in-
cident involving a woman student who was taken hostage during a visit
to one of the maximum security institutions."9 6 That same record,
however, includes testimony by Judson Locke, Commissioner for the
Board of Corrections of Alabama and the author of Regulation 204,
regarding a high incidence of violence generally in the prisons. 97  As
Justice Marshall noted in dissent, "There is simply no evidence in the
record to show that women guards would create any danger to security
in Alabama prisons significantly greater than already exists.198
While the majority purported to rely on expert testimony for its
conclusions regarding a woman's relative ability to function as a prison
guard, their rationale reflected the biased attitude of the witness who
may have qualified as an expert on prisons but who had no credentials
as a sociologist or psychologist. In testifying on the relative ability of
a woman and a man of the same height and weight to perform the job
of correctional counselor in an all-male institution, Commissioner Locke
concluded that a man could perform the job but a woman could not.
He justified his "expert" conclusion with psychological double-talk:
The innate intention [sic] between a male and a female.
The physical capabilities, the emotions that go into the
psychic make-up of a female vs. the psychic make-up of a
male. The attitude of the rural type inmate we have vs. that
of a woman [sic]. The superior feeling that a man has, his-
torically, over that of a female [sic]."9
Whatever merit such sentiments may have, they hardly qualify as
expert psychological testimony. The alleged sexist prejudices of rural
southern convicted felons can hardly be considered an adequate basis
to justify discrimination against women. Certainly Title VII was not
designed to cater to prisoners' biases, but rather to protect the victims
of such bias against discrimination.
96. Id. at 2730 n.22 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 2733-34.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2733.
99. Id. at 2734 n.2.
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By adopting such questionable logic as Locke's, the Court found
that a woman guard would pose a threat "to the basic control of the
penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the other security per-
sonnel. The employee's very womanhood would thus directly under-
mine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a cor-
rectional counselor's responsibility." 100
However, the record reveals conflicting expert testimony which in-
dicated that the presence of female guards had actually had a beneficial
effect on prison inmates. William R. Nelson, Warden of the Metro-
politan Correctional Center in Chicago, testified that male inmates be-
have better in the presence of female guards and that the presence of
women is a very strong normalizing influence. This view was shared
by another expert witness, Ray Nelson, who said the presence of
women has an advantageous psychological effect upon the prisoners.
C. Robert Sarver, former Commissioner of the Arkansas Department
of Corrections and former Director of the Department of Corrections
for West Virginia, testified that there was no reason why women should
not be hired and assigned as prison guards on an equal basis with
men.
101
The district court had discussed the reason propounded by the
prison administrators for Regulation 204-that women could not per-
form adequately and safely within the setting of an all-male peniten-
tiary. They found the state's purpose and rationale seemingly de-
feated, however, by the employment of females in contact positions at
all-male institutions other than the large penitentiaries, where their
duties are identical to those of male officers. 10 2
Acknowledging the variance of opinions in the corrections com-
munity concerning the presence of women in all-male institutions and
the consequent effect on inmates' privacy, the district court cited a
policy statement by the Federal Bureau of Prisons stating that: "The
Bureau of Prisons is committed to the goal of normalization as a part
of improving the correctional facilities. This integration of staff of both
sexes into all institutions will promote this development."'1 3  On the
basis of the evidence presented, the district court found Regulation 204
100. Id. at 2730.
101. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1184-85 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
102. Id. at 1184.
103. Id. (quoting FEDERAL PRISON SYsrmm, PoLicy STATEmENT No. 3713.7 of
January 7, 1976). -
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violated Title VII, "insofar as it denies women jobs as prison guards
in all-male prisons."'10 4
In its review of that decision, the Supreme Court pointed to "sub-
stantial testimony from experts on both sides of this litigation that the
use of women as guards in 'contact' positions under the existing condi-
tions in Alabama maximum security male penitentiaries would pose a
substantial security problem, directly linked to the sex of the prison
guard."'105 Such evidence was the basis for the conclusion that the dis-
trict court erred "in ruling that being male is not a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for the job of correctional counselor in a 'contact'
position in an Alabama male maximum security penitentiary."10 6
The majority dismissed as irrelevant evidence of women's satisfac-
tory performance as guards in other Alabama institutions:
The record shows by contrast, that Alabama's minimum
security facilities, such as work-release centers, are recog-
nized by their inmates as privileged confinement situations
not to be lightly jeopardized by disobeying applicable rules
of conduct. Inmates assigned to these institutions are thought
to be the "cream of the crop" of the Alabama prison popula-
tion.10 7
Without discrediting the opposing testimony or finding an absence
of adequate evidence to support the district court's decision, the
majority reversed on the basis of its own evaluation of the evidence.
Inasmuch as it is not the function of the Supreme Court to reevaluate
the facts found below, but rather to reverse findings of fact only when
there is insufficient evidence to support them,10 it is apparent that the
Court's appraisal of the record was decidedly unbalanced.
III. EEOC GUIDELINES AND THE LAW
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
created by Title VII and is the agency charged with interpreting and
enforcing its provisions.109 EEOC guidelines, however, do not have
104. Id. at 1185. The District Court also held that Regulation 204 violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
105. 97 S. Ct. at 2730.
106. Id. (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 2730 n.24.
108. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1959) (standard for review of
facts tried to the court below is "clearly erroneous" standard). See also FED. R. CIV.
P. 52(a). See generally cases cited in Annot., 11 A.L.R. 742 (1937).
109. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. IV 1974).
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the force of law" ° and their application by the Supreme Court in sex
discrimination cases has been inconsistent."' Close adherence to
EEOC guidelines in Gilbert and Dothard would have resulted in a dif-
ferent outcome for both cases. Instead, the guidelines were followed
only to the extent that they conformed to the result the Court wished
to reach.
In Gilbert the majority repudiated the EEOC guidelines which
mandate disability benefits for pregnancy.:" 2 Noting that the guide-
lines flatly contradicted an earlier position of the EEOC, the Court also
found them in conflict with a similar regulation issued under the Fair
Labor Standards Act," 3 which has been incorporated by amendment
into Title VII.1 4
Justice Brennan observed in dissent that prior Title VII decisions
had consistently acknowledged "the unique persuasiveness of EEOC
interpretations" in the area of economic and social inquiry." 5 Noting
that prior decisions" 6 had also accorded "great deference" to EEOC
interpretations, the dissent condemned the Court's rejection of the
Commission's 1972 guideline providing, that "[d]isabilities caused or
110. 429 U.S. at 141.
111. See, e.g., cases cited in note 116 infra.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975) (EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex). The Commission's authority to issue guidelines is derived from § 713(a) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970), which au-
thorizes the Commission to issue, amend, or rescind procedural regulations to carry out
the provisions of Title VII.
113. 29 U.S.C. H§ 201-206 (1970).
114. In 1972, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) by adding this
following sentence to the Title VII provision:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer
if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title
29.
An Act amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8(b), 86
Stat. 109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. 1 1972)).
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the majority construed
the legislative intent behind this addition as follows:
This sentence was proposed as the Bennett Amendment to the Senate Bill, 110
Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964), and Senator Humphrey, the floor manager of the
bill, stated that the purpose of the amendment was to make it "unmistakably
clear" that differences of treatment in industrial benefit plans, including earlier
retirement options for women, may continue in operation under this bill, if it
becomes law... :'[110 CONG. REc.] 13663-64 [1964].
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 144.
115. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155-56.
116. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544-47 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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contributed to by pregnancy . . . are, for all job-related purposes,
temporary disabilities . . . [under] any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan .... "'17
The dissent traced the research of the EEOC and its effort to
develop a policy reflecting well-informed consideration, during the
seven year interim between Title VII's enactment and promulgation of
the 1972 guideline. During this period the EEOC had refused to
impose liability on employers during the decision-making stages:
It is bitter irony that the care that preceded promulga-
tion of the 1972 guideline is today condemned by the Court
as tardy indecisiveness, its unwillingness irresponsibly to
challenge employers' practices during the formative period is
labeled as evidence of inconsistency, and this indecisiveness
and inconsistency are bootstrapped into reasons for denying
the Commission's interpretation its due deference.118
Pointing to the pregnancy-inclusive rules adopted by Congress
under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act'1 9 and Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972,120 among others, the dissent con-
cluded that "the EEOC's guideline merely settled upon a solution now
accepted by every other Western industrial country."'12  The disregard
shown by the Court for the EEOC guidelines appears to have been
based more on their content than on their actual merit. Because the
guidelines supported a conclusion the Court was not prepared to
accept, they were discredited and ignored.
EEOC guidelines were also relevant in Dothard in determining
the appropriateness of granting the bfoq exception to Alabama's ad-
ministrative regulation. The majority purported to follow the EEOC
interpretation which indicates that the exception was meant to be ex-
tremely narrow. 12 Presumably to distinguish their adherence to EEOC's
recommendation in Dothard from their rejection of the guideline in
Gilbert, the Court explained in footnote that the EEOC construction
of the statute could be given weight because "[it has adhered to that
117. 429 U.S. at 156 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 1604.10(b) (1975)).
118. Id. at 157.
119. 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-366 (1970). The specific pregnancy-inclusive language is
found at 45 U.S.C. § 351(k)(2) (Supp. II 1972).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. 1 1972). See 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1976).
121. 429 U.S. at 158 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFAPE,
SocIAL SECumITy PRoGAMs THRouHouT TE WORLD at ix, xviii, xix (Research Report
No. 40) (1971)).
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1975).
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principle consistently.' 12' Although referring to a series of cases
which applied the bfoq exception narrowly, and thereby essentially re-
jected it,'2 4 the Court concluded that the factual circumstances justified
accepting Regulation 204 "within the narrow ambit of the bfoq
exception.' 125
Justice Marshall appeared to have anticipated such abuse of the
bfoq exception in his concurring opinion in Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta:2 " "The exception for a 'bona fide occupational qualification' was
not intended to swallow the rule."12 7 Justice Marshall also pointed out
that the majority's justification of exclusion of women from positions
as prison guards "relies on precisely the type of generalized bias against
women that the Court agrees Title VII was intended to outlaw.'1 28
Justice Marshall's opinion in Dothard emphasized the irrelevance
of considering the danger involved in a guard's occupation and some
women's inability to protect themselves. Referring to the majority's own
language, he reiterated that the purpose of Title VII is "to allow the
individual woman to make that choice for herself."'- 29
As one commentator has uregd, sex may establish a bfoq "only if
all members of the particular class are innately incapable of performing
the requisite function of a job."' 30 In other words, any bfoq based on
sex creates an internal contradiction within Title VII because it "allows
persons to be evaluated according to their class status rather than their
individual capabilities."'' By adopting broad stereotypical notions of
women's general vulnerability to male prisoners as a justification for
the bfoq exception, the Court has buttressed the notion that men's fears
and prejudices about women may be used to define women's employ-
ment boundaries, without regard to the capabilities of the individual.
As Justice Marshall noted in his concurring opinion:
In short, the fundamental justification for the decision is that
123. 97 S. Ct. at 2729 n.19.
124. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
125. 97 S. Ct. at 2729.
126. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
127. Id. at 545. Justice Marshall concurred with the majority holding but strongly
disagreed with the suggestion that "[t]he existence of . . . family obligations, if demon-
strably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man" could, even if
proven, establish a bfoq. Id. at 544.
128. 97 S. Ct. at 2734.
129. Id. at 2733 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Shaman, Toward Defining and Abolishing the Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
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women as guards will generate sexual assaults. With all re-
spect, this rationale regrettably perpetuates one of the old
myths about women-that women, wittingly or not, are
seductive sexual objects. The effect of the decision, made I
am sure with the best of intentions, is to punish women be-
cause their very presence might provoke sexual assaults. It is
women who are made to pay the price in lost job opportuni-
ties for the threat of depraved conduct by prison inmates.
Once again, "[t]he pedestal upon which women have been
placed has . . ., upon closer inspection, been revealed as a
cage." It is particularly ironic that the cage is erected here
in response to feared misbehavior by imprisoned criminals.
To deprive women of job opportunities because of the
threatened behavior of convicted criminals is to turn our
social priorities upside down." 2
CONCLUSION
Presumably the stereotypes connected with a woman's sexuality
are so deeply ingrained as to be unrecognizable as such. Although
great strides have been made in overcoming long-held stereotypical
notions about the inherent inferiority of racial minorities, moves toward
eliminating sex discrimination have lagged far behind.
A sensitivity to sex stereotypes as great as one to racial stereotypes
would have precluded the results reached in Gilbert and Dothard. A
disability plan excluding only sickle cell anemia from coverage surely
would have been condemned as racially discriminatory at the outset,
with no possible attempt to justify such an exclusion on a cost basis.
By the same token, a regulation excluding blacks from positions as
guards in Alabama's prisons, based on the notion that the white prison-
ers' racial hatred creates too great a danger for black guards, would
have been viewed as transparent and blatant racial discrimination.
Until the Court is prepared to dispel sexist stereotypes with the
same vigor and determination which it has directed against racist
stereotypes, Title VII's strength will be sapped in combating sex dis-
crimination, and bfoq exceptions will be permitted to chip away its sub-
stance until it is no longer recognizable as the powerful force it was
originally believed to be.
It remains to be seen what the impact of Gilbert and Dothard will
132. 97 S. Ct. at 2734-35 (quoting from Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20,
485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (1971)).
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be.133 Because the Court refused to find sex discrimination in Gilbert,
it is conceivable that no discrimination based on pregnancy will be
found to Violate Title VII. Dothard has opened the door to broad dis-
cretion on the part of the judiciary to determine what constitutes a bfoq
exception to Title VII prohibitions against sex discrimination. Subse-
133. The Supreme Court recently heard arguments on two cases involving Title VII
sex discrimination charges against employers' maternity leave policies. Certiorari was
granted in both cases within a month after General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976), was handed down. Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977) (No. 75-1069); Satty v. Nash-
ville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977) (No.
75-536).
One plaintiff, Nora Satty, returned to work after her maternity leave to discover
that her job had been abolished and that she had lost her seniority rights to bid for an-
other job. Satty did not receive sick leave benefits during her maternityy leave because
company policy excluded pregnancy from the coverage of their sick pay plan. 522 F.2d
at 852.
Another plaintiff, Sonja Lynn Berg, is challenging the right of school board au-
thorities to tell her at what stage in her pregnancy she will no longer be able to work
as a teacher. The school board policy also denied sick leave pay during pregnancy ab-
sence. 528 F.2d at 1209-10.
The employers' policies in both cases were found by the circuit courts of appeals
to violate Title VII. 522 F.2d at 854; 528 F.2d at 1210. If the Supreme Court con-
tinues to except discrimination based on pregnancy from Title VII's proscriptions against
sex discrimination, reversals are likely in both cases.
Lower courts deciding similar cases following Gilbert have reached varying results.
One case, Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., Inc. 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977), decided two
months after Gilbert, dealt with a Title VII challenge to the constructive termination
of employment of an unmarried pregnant woman. The court found for the plaintiff,
holding that the claim was closer to that presented in Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), a constitutional challenge of mandatory maternity leave
policy, than that in Gilbert. Presumably the United States Supreme Court has utilized
a stricter standard for employment itself than for "benefits" associated with employ-
ment:
The recent holding of the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1976), that exclusion of
pregnancy from the risks covered by an employer's disability benefits plan does
not violate Title VII, can hardly be regarded as precedent for excluding preg-
nancy from protection against invidious employment termination.
550 F.2d at 370 n.12 (emphasis in original).
On motion for rehearing in Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 46 U.S.L.W. 2112
(D.S.C. 1977), the employer's failure to renew the plaintiff teacher's contract because
of her pregnancy was held not to violate Title VII. Earlier, the same court, following
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert (before the
Supreme Court's reversal), had found the school board practice violative of Title VII.
415 F. Supp. 512, 519 (D.S.C. 1976). Seven months after the Supreme Court ruling
in Gilbert, the district court on rehearing found that, "[i]n light of Gilbert and the
statutory language it construed, the school board's unwritten policy of the nonrenewal
of teacher contracts where a predicted period of absence is indicated, has not been
shown to constitute gender-based discrimination or to be gender-based in effect." 46
U.S.L.W. 2112 (D.S.C. 1977).
Responding to plaintiff's contention that LaFleur rather than Gilbert should control
on the issue of constitutional analysis, the district court found non-renewal of the
teacher's contract distinguishable from the mandatory maternity leave policy of LaFleur.
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quent Title VII cases will reveal whether the Court will continue to fall
"into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about
the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination.' ' 4
Paula Smoot Ogg
Unlike the impermissably broad irrebuttable presumption of inability to work after
reaching a given stage of pregnancy, inherent in the mandatory leave policy, the policy
at hand was held not to create an irrebuttable presumption. Rather the court stated that
it was a policy "designed to insure the continuity of the instructional process without
regard to the reason for the absence and without setting up a presumption of unfitness
for any purpose." 46 U.S.L.W. at 2113.
The confusion may be resolved by congressional amendment of Title VII to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. Such a bill was approved recently by the Sen-
ate, S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and is now before the House of Representa-
tives. S.995 provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in sec-
tion 702(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 123 CoNO.
Ruc. 15059.
123 CONo. Rc. 15059 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977).
134. 400 U.S. at 542.
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